Is it possible to persuade mankind to live without war

Fifth, some countries may find nuclear weapons a cheaper and safer alternative to running economically ruinous and militarily dangerous conventional arms races. Nuclear weapons may promise increased security and independence at an affordable price. Sixth, countries may want nuclear weapons for offensive purposes.

This, however, is an unlikely motivation for reasons given below. Finally, by building nuclear weapons a country may hope to enhance its international standing. This is thought to be both a reason for and a consequence of developing nuclear weapons. One may enjoy the prestige that comes with nuclear weapons, and indeed a yearning for glory was not absent from de Gaulle's soul.

But the nuclear military business is a serious one, and we may expect that deeper motives than desire for prestige lie behind the decision to enter it. Mainly for reasons two through five, new members will occasionally enter the nuclear club. Nuclear weapons will spread from one country to another in the future for the same reasons they have spread in the past. What effects may we expect? Relations among Nuclear Nations.

In one important way nuclear weapons do change the relations of nations. Adversary states that acquire them are thereby made more cautious in their dealings with each other.

For the most part, however, the relations of nations display continuity through their transition from non-nuclear to nuclear status.

Relations between the United States and the new nuclear states were much the same before and after they exploded atomic devices, as Michael Nacht points out. This continuity of relations suggests a certain ambivalence. The spread of nuclear weapons, though dreaded, prompts only mild reactions when it happens. Our 'special relationship' with Britain led us to help her acquire and maintain nuclear forces. The distance tinged with distrust that marks our relations with France led us to oppose France's similar endeavours.

China's nuclear forces neither prevented American-Chinese rapprochement earlier nor prompted it later. India's nuclear explosion in neither improved nor worsened relations with the United States in the long term. Unlike Canada, we did not deny India access to our nuclear supplies. In asking Congress not to oppose his waiving the requirement, the President said this. Nor did Pakistan's refusal to promise not to conduct nuclear tests prevent the United States from proposing to provide military aid after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December of Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons has had a high priority for American governments, but clearly not the highest.

In practice, other interests have proved to be more pressing. This is evident in our relations with every country that has developed nuclear weapons, or appeared to be on the verge of doing so, from Britain onwards.

What holds for the United States almost surely holds for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has strongly supported efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. She has good reasons to do so. Many potential nuclear states are both nearby and hostile from West Germany through Pakistan to South Korea. Others, like Iraq and India, are nearby and friendly.

No doubt the Soviet Union would prefer conventional to nuclear neighbours whatever their present leanings may be. But also, after the discredit earned in occupying Afghanistan, the Soviet Union would like to repair relations with third-world countries. If we had refused to supply nuclear fuel to India, would the Soviet Union have done so? Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and others thought so. For the Soviet Union, as for the United States, other interests may weigh more heavily than her interest in halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

One may wonder, however, whether the quality of relations changes within alliances as some of their members become nuclear powers. Alliances relate nations to one another in specific and well defined ways. By acquiring nuclear weapons a country is said to erode, and perhaps to wreck, the alliance to which it belongs.

In part this statement mistakes effects for causes. Alliances are weakened by the doubts of some countries that another country will risk committing national suicide through retaliation against a nuclear power that attacks an ally. The Alliance holds together because even its nuclear members continue to depend on the United States. In an unbalanced world, when the weak feel threatened, they seek aid and protection from the strong. Nuclear weapons were maintained by Britain and acquired by France at least in part as triggers for America's strategic deterrent.

They also wish to determine the form the commitment takes and the manner of its execution. After all, an American choice about how to respond to threats in Europe is a choice that affects the lives of Europeans and may bring their deaths.

Europeans want a large voice in American policies that may determine their destiny. By mounting nuclear weapons. Britain and France hope to decide when we will retaliate against the Soviet Union for acts committed in Europe. Since retaliation risks our destruction, we resist surrendering the decision.

Alliances gain strength through a division of military labour. Whether or not they are nuclear, lesser powers feeling. Countries that are weak and threatened will continue to rely on the support of more powerful ones and to hope that the latter will bear a disproportionate share of the burden. Relations of dependency are hardest to break where dependent states cannot shift from reliance on one great power to reliance on another.

Under those circumstances, alliances endure even as nuclear weapons spread among their members. From NATO'S experience we may conclude that alliances are not wrecked by the spread of nuclear weapons among their members.

NATO accommodates both nuclear and conventional states in ways that continue to evolve. Contemplating the nuclear past gives grounds for hoping that the world will survive if further nuclear powers join today's six or seven. The likelihood of avoiding destruction as more states become members of the nuclear club is often coupled with the question who those states will be.

Nuclear Weapons and Domestic Stability. What are the principal worries? Because of the importance of controlling nuclear weapons—of keeping them firmly in the hands of reliable officials—rulers of nuclear states may become more authoritarian and ever more given to secrecy.

Moreover, some potential nuclear states are not politically strong and stable enough to ensure control of the weapons and of the decision to use them. Fears are compounded by the danger of internal coups in which the control of nuclear weapons may he the main object of the struggle and the key to political power.

Under these fearful circumstances to maintain governmental authority and civil order may be impossible. The legitimacy of the state and the loyalty of its citizenry may dissolve because the state is no longer thought to be capable of maintaining external security and internal order.

Both these fears may be realized, either in different states or, indeed, in the same state at different times. What can one say? Four things primarily. First, Possession of nuclear weapons may slow arms races down, rather than speed them up, a possibility considered later. Second, for less developed countries to build nuclear arsenals requires a long lead time. They have to deal with today's problems and hope for the best tomorrow. In such states, soldiers help to maintain leaders in power or try to overthrow them.

They like to command troops and squadrons. Their vested interests are in the military's traditional trappings. A nuclear state may be unstable or may become so. Who would they aim at? How would they use them as instruments for maintaining or gaining control? I see little more reason to fear that one faction or another in some less developed country will fire atomic weapons in a struggle for political power than that they will be used in a crisis of succession in the Soviet Union or China.

One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of regime. Those who fear the worst have not shown with any plausibility how those expected events may lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, the possibility of one side in a civil war firing a nuclear warhead at its opponent's stronghold nevertheless remains.

Such an act would produce a national tragedy. This question then arises: Once the weapon is fired, what happens next? The domestic use of nuclear weapons is, of all the uses imaginable, least likely to lead to escalation and to threaten the stability of the central balance.

The United States and the Soviet Union, and other countries as well, would have the strongest reasons to issue warnings and to assert control. Nuclear weapons and regional stability. Nuclear weapons are not likely to be used at home. Are they likely to be used abroad? As nuclear weapons spread, what new causes may bring effects different from and worse than those known earlier in the nuclear age?

Where States are bitter enemies one may fear that they will be unable to resist using their nuclear weapons against each other. This is a worry about the future that the past does not disclose. Nuclear weapons have caused China and the Soviet Union to deal cautiously with each other.

Moreover, those who believe that bitterness causes wars assume a close association that is seldom found between bitterness among nations and their willingness to run high risks. Second, some new nuclear states may have governments and societies that are not well rooted. Idi Amin and Muammar el-Qaddafi fit into these categories, and they are favourite examples of the kinds of rulers who supposedly cannot be trusted to manage nuclear weapons responsibly. Qaddafi has shown similar restraint.

He and Anwar Sadat have been openly hostile since In July of both sides launched commando attacks and air raids, including two large air strikes by Egypt on Libya's el Adem airbase. Neither side let the attacks get out of hand. Qaddafi showed himself to he forbearing and amenable to mediation by other Arab leaders.

Many Westerners who write fearfully about a future in which third-world countries have nuclear weapons seem to view their people in the once familiar imperial manner as 'lesser breeds without the law'. How do we know, someone has asked, that a nuclear-armed and newly hostile Egypt or a nuclear-armed and still hostile Syria would not strike to destroy Israel at the risk of Israeli bombs falling on some of their cities?

More than a quarter of Syria's live in three: Damascus. Aleppo, and Homs. Rulers want to have a country that they can continue to rule. Some Arab country might wish that some other Arab country would risk its own destruction for the sake of destroying Israel, but there is no reason to think that any Arab country would do so. Arabs did not marshal their resources and make an all-out effort to destroy Israel in the years before Israel could strike back with nuclear warheads.

We cannot expect countries to risk more in the presence of nuclear weapons than they have in their absence. States that are radical at home. Few states have been radical in the conduct of their foreign policy, and fewer have remained so for long. States coexist in a competitive arena. States can remain radical in foreign policy only if they are overwhelmingly strong—as none of the new nuclear states will be—or if their radical acts fall short of damaging vital interests of nuclear powers.

States that acquire nuclear weapons will not be regarded with indifference. States that want to be freewheelers have to stay out of the nuclear business. A nuclear Libya, for example, would have to show caution, even in rhetoric, lest she suffer retaliation in response to someone else's anonymous attack on a third state. Nuclear weapons induce caution, especially in weak states. Fourth, while some worry about nuclear states coming in hostile pairs, others worry that the bipolar pattern will not be reproduced regionally in a world populated by larger numbers of nuclear states.

The simplicity of relations that obtains when one party has to concentrate its worry on only one other, and the ease of calculating forces and estimating the dangers they pose, may be lost.

Whatever the structure, the relations of states run in various directions. She also has to worry about China's forces. Fifth, in some of the new nuclear states, civil control of the military maybe shaky.

Nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of military officers more inclined than civilians to put them to offensive use. This again is an old worry. And in the People's Republic of China military and civil branches of government have been not separated but fused.

Although one may prefer civil control, preventing a highly destructive war does not require it. Soldiers may he more cautious than civilians. They do not like to fight conventional wars under unfamiliar conditions.

Nobody knows what a nuclear battlefield would look like, and nobody knows what happens after the first city is hit. Uncertainiy about the course that a nuclear war might follow, along with the certainty that destruction can he immense, strongly inhibits the first use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons have never been used in a world in which two or more states possessed them. These possibilities are examined in the next section. Consider blackmail first. Two conditions make for the success of nuclear blackmail. First, when only one country had nuclear weapons, threats to use them had more effect. In Korea, we had gone so far that the threat to go further was plausible. The successful seige of Dien Bien Pbu in the spring of that year showed the limitations of such threats.

Capabilities foster policies that employ them. But monstrous capabilities foster monstrous policies, which when contemplated are seen to be too horrible to carry through. No state can make the threat with credibility because no state can expect to execute the threat without danger to themselves. Some have feared that nuclear weapons may be fired anonymously—by radical Arab states, for example, to attack an Israeli city so as block a peace settlement.

But the state exploding the warhead could not be sure of remaining unidentified. Once two or more countries have nuclear weapons, the response to nuclear threats, even against non-nuclear states, becomes unpredictable.

Although nuclear weapons are poor instruments for blackmail, would they not provide a cheap and decisive offensive force against a conventionally armed enemy? And what goals could a conventionally strong Iran have entertained that would have tempted her to risk using nuclear weapons? A country that takes the nuclear offensive has to fear an appropriately punishing strike by someone.

Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offence even against a non-nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons do not make nuclear war a likely prospect, as history has so far shown.

No one can say that nuclear weapons will never be used. Their use, although unlikely, is always possible. In asking what the spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world, we are asking about the effects to be expected as a larger number of relatively weak states get nuclear weapons. If such states use nuclear weapons, the world will not end.

And the use of nuclear weapons by lesser powers would hardly trigger them elsewhere, with the US and the USSR becoming involved in ways that might shake the central balance. A number of problems arc thought to attend the efforts of minor powers to use nuclear weapons for deterrence. In this section, I ask how hard these problems are for new nuclear states to solve. The Forces Required for Deterrence. In considering the physical requirements of deterrent forces, we should recall the difference between prevention and pre-emption.

A pre-emptive strike is launched by one state to blunt an attack that another state is presumably preparing to launch. The first danger posed by the spread of nuclear weapons would seem to be that each new nuclear state may tempt an old one to strike preventively in order to destroy an embryonic nuclear capability before it can become militarily effective. When Francis P. Thus President Nasser warned Israel in that Egypt would attack if she were sure that Israel was building a bomb.

The uneven development of the forces of potential and of new nuclear states creates occasions that seem to permit preventive strikes and may seem to invite them. First, a country may be in an early stage of nuclear development and be obviously unable to make nuclear weapons.

Second, a country may be in an advanced stage of nuclear development, and whether or not it has some nuclear weapons may not be surely known. A preventive strike would seem to be most promising during the first stage of nuclear development.

But would one strike so hard as to destroy the very potential for future nuclear development? If not, the country struck could simply resume its nuclear career. To do either would be difficult and costly. Arab states that may attempt to do so will now be all the more secretive and circumspect. A preventive strike during the second stage of nuclear development is even less promising than a preventive strike during the first stage. To know for sure that the country attacked has not already produced or otherwise acquired some deliverable warheads becomes increasingly difficult.

Fission bombs may work even though they have not been tested, as was the case with the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. And if the number is zero and Egypt can be sure of that, she would still not know how many days are required for assembling components that may be on hand.

Preventive strikes against states that have, or may have, nuclear weapons are hard to imagine, but what about pre-emptive ones? The new worry in a world in which nuclear weapons have spread is that states of limited and roughly similar capabilities will use them against one another.

They do not want to risk nuclear devastation anymore than we do. With delicate forces, states are tempted to launch disarming strikes before their own forces can be struck and destroyed. To be effective a deterrent force must meet three requirements.

First, a part of the force must appear to be able to survive an attack and launch one of its own. Second, survival of the force must not require early firing in response to what may be false alarms. Third, weapons must not be susceptible to accidental and unauthorized use. Nobody wants vulnerable. Will new nuclear states find ways to hide their weapons, to deliver them, and to control them? Will they be able to deploy and manage nuclear weapons in ways that meet the physical requirements of deterrent forces?

The United States even today worries about the vulnerability of its vast and varied arsenal. The Soviet Union could not be sure that we would fail to launch on warning or fail to retaliate later. In this respect, as in others, strategic discourse now lacks the clarity and precision it once had. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have strategic nuclear weapons that can destroy some of the other sides strategic nuclear weapons.

Deterrent forces are seldom delicate because no state wants delicate forces and nuclear forces can easily be made sturdy. Nuclear weapons are fairly small and light. They are easy to hide and to move.

Early in the nuclear age, people worried about atomic bombs being concealed in packing boxes and placed in holds of ships to be exploded when a signal was given. Now more than ever people worry about terrorists stealing nuclear warheads because various states have so many of them. Everybody seems to believe that terrorists are capable of hiding bombs. Why should states be unable to do what terrorist gangs are though to be capable of?

Yoga is an exact science and a delicate art. Secondly, be as methodical and mechanical as possible. Never tug, swain, or pull strenuously.

Forcing will cause your body to resist and will actually slow down or even prevent your progress. Go gently, stretch up to the point where it would start to hurt, and then stop immediately. The key is proper breathing through the nostrils with the mouth shut. Many times it is best to practice alone in a well-ventilated room, preferably wearing little or no clothing. Never practice on a full stomach because an empty one permits greater flexibility.

Exercise will benefit your general health. Yoga cannot add or subtract pounds from your figure; only eating more or less food, that is, increasing or decreasing your caloric intake, can do that. So the hummingbird can hover and even fly backwards. For laymen ethnology is the most interesting of the biological sciences for the very reason that it concerns animals in their normal activities and therefore,if we wish,we can assess the possible dangers and advantages in our own behavioral roots.

Ethnology also is interesting methodologically because it combines in new ways very scrupulous field observations with experimentation in laboratories. The field workers have had some handicaps in winning respect for themselves. For a long time they were considered as little better than amateur animal-watchers—certainly not scientists,since their facts were not gained by experimental procedures:they could not conform.

Of course many situations in the lives of animals simply cannot be rehearsed and controlled in this way. The fall flocking of wild free birds cant be,or the roving animals over long distances, or even the details of spontaneous family relationships. Since these never can be reproduced in a laboratory, they are then not worth knowing about? The ethnologists who choose field work have got themselves out of this impasse by greatly refining, the techniques of observing.

At the start of a project all the animals to be studied are live-trapped,marked individually,and released. Motion pictures,often in color, provide permanent records of their subsequent activities.

Recording of the animals voices by electrical sound equipment is considered essential,and the most meticulous notes are kept of all that occurs. With this material other biologists,far from the scene,later can verify the reports.

Moreover, two field observers often go out together,checking each others observations right there in the field. Ethnology, the word, is derived from the Greek ethos, meaning the characteristic traits or features which distinguish a group-any particular group of people or,in biology,a group of animals such as a species.

Ethnologists have the intention of studying "the whole sequence of acts which constitute an animals behavior. Security and commodity exchanges are trading posts where people meet who wish to buy and sell. The exchanges themselves do no trading,they merely provide a place where prospective buyers and sellers can meet and conduct their business. Wall Street,although the best known,is not home of exchanges in the United States. There are the cotton exchanges in New Orleans and Chicago; the Mercantile Exchange which deals in many farm products in Chicago; and grain exchanges in many of the large cities of the Midwest.

Some exchanges,like Chicago Board of Trade, provide market services for several kinds of products. These trading posts where products may be brought or sold are called commodity exchanges.

The security exchanges,on the other hand,are meeting places where stocks and bonds are traded. It is not easy to change very old mental habits, but this is what must be attempted. I believe this to be a big mistake. Their supporters believe in them so deeply that they are willing to go to war in support of them. The movement of world opinion during the past few years has been very largely such as we can welcome.

It has become a common place that nuclear war must be avoided. Of course very difficult problems remain in the world, but the spirit in which they are coming nearer to is a better one than it was some years ago. The place was totally uncared for, quite and overgrown with all sorts of useless things. I my way through bushes and tall weeds to the front door and rang the bell. I was glad that I had found him. In twenty minutes he me right on all the that had puzzled me. I never touch it at all.

It a pity to let all this ground go to waste. I lived here when I was a child, and I had of gardening then. My brother and I did all of it between us year after year.

There was one right way and many wrong ways. It used to me. It appeared in my dreams—a mistake here, something not quite straight here, the enemy showing its head in a place I was to have cleaned.

The work was too much. It seemed endless. The size of the place was itself a fight to a boy. This garden and I are now the best friends. I like it grow its own way. I make no demands on it. I never disturb it, and it never disturbs me.

It has at last, and so have I. Since around the later part of the s, society started to realize that tobacco cigarettes caused health problems.